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Abstract 
A Perspective on Confidence and Its Use in 
Focusing Attention during Knowledge Acquisition 
David Beckerman and Holly Jimison 
Medical Computer Science Group 
Knowledge Systems Laboratory 
Stanford University 
Medical School Office Building, Room 215 
Stanford, California 94305 
We examine a Bayesian approach for accommodating beliefs and preferences that 
are held with partial confidence. An important notion highlighted by the method is 
that additional modeling can be valuable when complete confidence is lacking. We 
develop a meta-decision-analytic approach to balance the benefits of additional 
modeling with associated costs. We show how the approach can be used during 
knowledge acquisition to focus the attention of a knowledge engineer or expert on 
parts of a decision model that deserve additional refinement. 
Introduction 
In attempting to automate the reasoning of experts in complex domains, artificial intelligence 
researchers have explored methods for representing decision problems, including probability 
and decision theory [1, 2], the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions [3, 4], and fuzzy 
set theory [5]. One argument against decision theory is that it will not accommodate 
situations in which an expert is unable or unwilling to specify precise beliefs and preferences. 
Another argument against the theory is that, even if an expert is able to provide assessments, 
the number of assessments associated with a complex problem is so enormous that the task of 
model construction becomes unmanageable. 
In this paper, we will show that the first argument is incorrect by examining an approach 
developed within the Bayesian theory for representing beliefs and preferences that are held 
with partial confidence. More important we will develop the Bayesian perspective on 
confidence into a methodology for focusing attention during the process of knowledge 
acquisition. We will see that this approach can increase the efficiency of the 
model-development task by helping an expert or knowledge engineer to identify portions of a 
model that are most worthwhile to refine. In developing this approach, we reduce the 
credibility of the argument that formal models of complex domains are necessarily 
unmanageable. 
First, we examine an approach developed within the Bayesian paradigm for accommodating 
beliefs and preferences that are held with partial confidence. In doing so, we see that 
additional modeling often is valuable when assessments are not held with complete confidence. 
We then develop a method that uses decision theory to balance the benefits of additional 
modeling with associated costs, and we discuss how the method can be used to focus attention 
during knowledge acquisition. We next relate our approach to existing methodologies for 
representing confidence and focusing attention. Finally, we discuss questions raised by our 
approach and suggest areas for further research. 
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A Bayesian perspective on confidence 
A method for accommodating beliefs and preferences held with partial confidence has been 
discussed in the Bayesian literature for over two decades [6, 7]. The basic notion underlying 
the method is that a person does not feel completely confident in assessing the probability of 
an event when the probability is influenced by other events with unknown outcomes. That is, 
a person will be uncomfortable providing a point probability for an event whenever the 
probability depends on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of other events. This principle applies 
to preferences held with partial confidence as well. 
Given this perspective, the method for accommodating lack of confidence is straightforward. 
Suppose a person wishes to assess the probability of an event X but is unable or unwilling to 
provide a precise value. The assessment procedure begins by asking the person to identify 
other events that have outcomes which influence the probability of X. Once these influencing 
or conditioning events are identified, the person typically is able to supply probabilities for the 
event X conditioned on each of the possible outcomes of the influencing events. If not, 
additional influencing events are identified until the person is comfortable in providing 
assessments. Next, the person is asked to supply probabilities for the influencing events. This 
procedure is applied recursively to any event for which the person is uncomfortable supplying 
a point value.1 The probability of X can then be computed from the conditional and 
unconditional assessments using the laws of probability [8]. This process has been called 
extending the conversation [6]. An analogous procedure exists for assessing preferences held 
with partial confidence. 
To illustrate the approach, suppose we ask a person for his probability that a given football 
team will win a forthcoming game.2 We discover that he is uncomfortable supplying a point 
value because his probability for a win depends on three factors: (1) whether a star player, 
recently threatened with suspension by league authorities, will be able to play, (2) whether the 
playing field will be dry or muddy because of rain, and (3) whether the promise of a bonus to 
the winning players will be confirmed. We will label these events Sus, Field, and Bonus, 
respectively. 
At this point, sUppose the person is :willing to provide point values for the probability of a 
win conditioned on each; of the possible outcomes of the three conditioning· events. A 
hypothetical set of assessments is shown in the second column of Table 1. Also suppose that 
the person is able to assess point values for each of the influencing events, say 
p(Suspension) = 0.6, p(Dry-Field) = 0.7, p(Bonus) = 0.2. Finally, assume that the person 
believes that the influencing events are independent, so we can compute the probability of each 
combination of outcomes as shown in the third column of Table 1. 
A plot of the third versus the second column of Table 1 is shown in Figure 1. This plot 
graphically depicts the nature of partial confidence in the person's assessment of p(Win). The 
quantity p(Win) varies as a function of the outcomes of the influencing events. In general, the 
wider the "curve" in such a plot, the lower the confidence in the assessment. 
Finally, as we mentioned, the laws of probability can be used to compute the person's 
probability of a win from these assessments. In particular, 
p(Win) = � p(Win 1 Sus, Field, Bonus) p(Sus, Field, Bonus) = 0. 53. 
where the sum ranges over all possible outcomes of the influencing events. 
1An infinite regress is possible, in the9ry; however, t�e focusing method described in this paper offers a practical 
terrnination condition. 
2This example is taken from [7]. 
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Conditioning events 
No-sus Dry-Field Bonus 
No-sus Dry-Field No-Bonus 
No-sus Wet-Field Bonus 
No-sus Wet-Field No-Bonus 
Sus Dry-Field Bonus 
Sus Dry-Field No-Bonus 
Sus Wet-Field Bonus 
Sus Wet-Field No-Bonus 
p(WiniEvents) 
0.7 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
0.4 
p(Events) 
(0.4)(0. 7)(0.2) 
= 0.06 
(0.4)(0.7)(0.8) 
= 0.22 
(0.4)(0.3)(0.2) 
= 0.02 
(0.4)(0.3)(0.8) 
= 0.10 
(0.6)(0.7)(0.2) 
= 0.08 
(0.6 )(0. 7)(0.8) = 0.34 
(0.6)(0.3)(0.2) 
= 0.04 
(0.6)(0.3)(0.8) 
= 0.14 
Table 1: The probability of a win conditioned on relevant events. 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
p(Events) 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
p(Win I Events) 
Figure 1: A plot of the assessments in Table 1.  
Benefits of additional knowledge acquisition 
1.0 
The process of identifying partial confidence in assessments and extending the conversation 
can be quite valuable in a decision context. One benefit is that the process suggests 
experiments that can be done to update probabilities and utilities before decisions based on 
these quantities are made. Another· benefit is. that the process of extending the conversation 
itself can lead to improved probability and utility assessments. In both cases, the improved 
assessments can lead to decisions of higher expected value. 
To illustrate the first point, suppose our probability assessor of the previous sectioh is 
offered the chance to gamble on the outcome of the game. If he decides to bet, he will receive 
$5000 if his team wins, and he will have to pay $5000 if his team loses. The decision tree for 
this situation is shown in Figure 2. Assuming the person is an expected-value decision maker,3 
he will prefer the alternative of accepting the bet, which has an expected value of $300. 
Now, if the decision maker extends the conversation, a potentially valuable option is 
immediately suggested. In particular, he might be better off if he can delay the decision of 
whether to bet until just before the game starts, perhaps by buying this option from his fellow 
gambler. Delaying the bet is potentially valuable because the outcomes of the conditioning 
events will be revealed before the start of· the game. Knowing the outcomes, the decision 
maker can selectively make or avoid the bet to his benefit. For example, if the star player is 
suspended, the playing field is muddy, and the bonus offer is denied, the decision maker's 
probability for a win becomes 0.4. By avoiding the bet in this situation, the decision maker 
saves $1000 in expected value. Because this conjunction of outcomes for the conditioning 
3Th is assumption is made Lo simplify· compulalion. IL is by no means necessary. 
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events occurs with probability 0.14 (see Table 1), his net expected savings due to delaying the 
decision is $140. More formally, the value of delaying the decision in this case is equal to the 
value of perfect information [9] on the three conditioning variables. 
Extending the conversation has suggested a simple delay option which has increased the 
expected value of the situation. Of course, we can imagine other situations in which more 
complex experiments might be designed and implemented to update the probabilities and 
utilities associated with a future decision. ln general, the absence of complete confidence in a 
probability or utility assessment should serve as a flag that additional information gathering 
might be valuable. 
Win 
$5000 
Lose 
'----- -$5000 
Do not bet 
$0 
Figure 2: A decision tree for a football bet. 
As we mentioned, extending the conversation also is valuable in that the process itself can 
lead to improved assessments and therefore to decisions of higher expected value. In the 
situation described, for example, it is unlikely that the individual would give a probability of 
0.53 for p(Win) prior to extension. lt is far more likely that he would give some coarse value 
such as 0.4, 0.5, or 0.6. Thus, if our probability assessor does not model his confidence in 
assessing p(Win), there is a reasonable chance that he will decline the bet, thereby throwing 
away the opportunity to earn an expected $300. Underlying this argument, is the assumption 
that the assessments produced by extending the conversation more accurately reflect the beliefs 
of the decision maker. This assumption is often validated in practice, in the sense that an 
assessor usually prefers to use the assessments . generated from extensions over direct 
assessments. We will make this assumption throughout the paper. 
We have distinguished two classes of benefits for the purposes of this presentation. In 
practice, however, both benefits typically are realized in the process of extending the 
conversation. For example, in recognizing partial confidence in the assessment for p(Win) and 
consequently extending the conversation, our gambler will benefit both by improving his 
current assessment of p(Win) and by ,discovering the delay option. 
.\.n .approach for focus�ng atlenti.on during knowledge acquisition 
The value of additional knowledge acquisition does not come without cost. In our simple 
example, this cost has not been salient. Imagine, however, a complex decision problem in 
which tens or hundreds of probabilities and utilities need to be assessed. Refining each 
assessment in this case would almost certainly overwhelm any decision maker. 
In this section, we develop a method in which decision theory is used at the metalevel to 
balance the benefits of extending the conversation in a given region of a model against the 
costs associated with extension. In doing so, we provide a tool that can help to direct a 
knowledge engineer or expert to areas of a model that are most deserving of attention during 
knowledge acquisition. 
To begin, we focus on the inputs req\lired in our approach. For each assessment that it not 
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made with complete confidence, our approach dictates that two pieces of information be 
specified: a measure of the degree to which the assessment might change with additional 
modeling, and a measure of the cost associated with this task. We examine each of these 
measures in turn. 
Consider an event or outcome X for which the decision maker is unwilling or unable to 
provide a precise probability or utility. First, the decision maker is asked to imagine a specific 
assessment scenario for X. For example, he might imagine simply extending the conversation, 
or he might imagine both extending the conversalion and observing one or more conditioning 
events before a decision is made. The exact nature of the scenario is determined by the 
decision maker. Then, to measure the degree to which an assessment might change, the 
decision maker is asked to a specify a probability distribution over the variable ¢(X), defined 
to be the value of the probability of X or utility of X after the assessment scenario is 
complete. We have already seen an idealized example of such a distribution in Figure 1. 
To be practical, our approach does not require a precise distribution over (/J. The precise 
specification of such a distribution probably would take more time than a full extension of the 
conversation for X. Instead, only an estimate of the distribution is needed. For example, the 
25 and 75-percent fractiles of the distribution provided by the decision maker could be fitted 
to a convenient parametric curve, such as the beta distribution. Alternatively, the decision 
maker might be allowed to draw a rough sketch of the distribution. 
A measure of the cost associated with the assessment scenario imagined for X also is required 
in our approach. The decision maker is asked to specify this quantity directly. Of course, this 
cost might be uncertain. For example, the decision maker might imagine an assessment 
scenario of extending the conversation followed by the implementation of as-yet-undetermined 
experiments. In such situations, however, we require only an approximate mean. As before, 
forcing the expert to be completely precise would result in modeling costs that outweigh a full 
extension of the conversation for X. 
Now let us consider how these measures can be used to balance the cost and benefits of 
additional assessment. Imagine that a working model of a decision problem has �een 
developed and that a decision maker ·suspects that the set of events4 and outcomes 
{X1, X2, ... Xn} deserves attention. First, in our approach, the value of additional modeling is 
calculated by computing the value ·of · perfect information on the set of· variables 
{¢J(X1). ifJ(X2), (p(X3)}. A. Monte Carlo technique is useful for such a computation [10]. Next, the cost ' of additional modeling is calculated by computing the sum of the costs assigned 
to each of these variables for the given scenafio.5 The assessment scenario is recommended if 
and only if the computed value exceeds the computed cost. 
This approach helps to focus the attention of the decision maker during model construction. 
If the benefits of applying a particular assessment scenario to a set of variables exceeds the 
costs, our method assures the decision maker that the scenario is worthwhile to pursue. · If the 
costs outweigh the benefits, the approach leads to decision maker to consider other scenarios 
and other combinations of variables. ln either case, the method can be used many times 
during knowledge acquisition to guide the decision maker to areas of the model that deserve 
attention. 
To illustrate the approach, let us return to the football example discussed earlier. Suppose 
the decisiori inaker has established the decision modet shown in Figure 2 and that he has 
approximately 1 hour to make the bet before his gambling associate retracts the offer. Our 
4The events in Lhe sel may be condilionttl or unconditional. 
5rn Lh� computations of value and cost, we assume that the assessments of the ?(Xi) are independent. This 
assumption will be discussed in a later section. 
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decision maker is not comfortable with his assessment of p(Win) and wonders whether it is 
worth his time to extend the conversation on this event. To evaluate the tradeoff, he specifies 
a rough distribution for (,b(Win), defined to be his probability for a win after extending the 
conversation. The distribution is constructed by fitting a beta distribution to his estimate that 
the 25 and 75-percent fractiles are 0.5 and 0.6, respectively. In addition, he determines that 
the cost associated with 1 hour of analysis is roughly $50. In this case, a Monte Carlo analysis 
yields a value of perfect information of approximately $150, so it is recommended that our 
decision maker take the time to extend the conversation. 
This simple example is given to illustrate the approach. It is unlikely, in practice, that the 
procedure would be used on a model of such small proportions. In such cases, the decision of 
whether or not to refine the model usually will be intuitively obvious. Instead, the method is 
likely to become attractive when the number of variables analyzed is large and the resolution 
of assessment tradeoffs is no longer obvious. 
We conclude this section with several comments about the definition of ¢>(X). First, we note 
an important restriction on the assessment scenario implicit in the definition of (,b(X). In 
principle, a decision maker can imagine any assessment scenario. For example, a decision 
maker could imagine a scenario in which infinite thought is applied to assessment of 
X. Alternatively, he could imagine a scenario in which all propositions relevant to X, except X 
itself, are observed. Such scenarios might be useful in constructing models of confidence. 
However, for purposes of decision making, an assessment scenario should be limited to efforts 
that take place before a decision is made. There is no value to an assessment scenario in 
which probabilities or utilities change after the decision is made. Beyond this restriction, the 
scenario can take any form that is advantageous to the decision maker. Tn the example we 
discussed, the decision maker knows that he has only 1 hour to make a decision, and thus the 
assessment scenario is taken to be an extension of the conversation during this time. 
Alternatively, the decision maker may know that he can make the bet as late as the start of the 
game. In this case, the assessment scenario could be defined as both an extension of the 
conversation and the observation of conditionin� events. 
Second, note that the probability .distribution over ¢>(X) is closely related to the notion of 
confidence. Wide distributions correspond to probability and utility assessments that are held 
with little confidence whereas sharply, peaked distributions correspond to assessments. held with 
a high degree of confidence. We do not 'ctaim, however, that a probability distribution over 
¢>(X) is an accurate descriptive representation of confidence. An argument against such a 
claim. is that it does not . seem likely that a person imagines precisely-defined assessment 
scenarios when introspecting directly about confidence. Perhaps, however, a vague class or ill­
defined classes of scenarios are being implicitly imagined when an individual is asked to 
specify a "degree of confidence" for a given assessment. It would be interesting to characterize 
such classes, if they exist, through empirical studies. 
Relationship to other approaches 
In this section we discuss the relationship of our approach to existing methodologies for 
representing confidence and to classic methods for focusing attention in model construction. 
We also examine the rela�ive merits of each approach. 
A traditional method for focusing attention during model development is stochastic 
sensitivity analysis [9]. In this approach, a probability or utility is swept through its full 
range of possible values, and the expected utility for each alternative is plotted as a function 
of the value of the variable. The plot reveals the sensitivity of a decision to the variable 
being analyzed. 
A stochastic sensitivity analysis for p(Win) in the simple football example is shown in 
Figure 3. In this case, a small downward change in p(Win) near the baseline value of 0.53 
· results in a reversal of the optimal alternative. Moreover, the difference in expected utilities 
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between the two alternatives, Bet and Do not bet, is a relatively strong function of p(Win). 
Because our decision maker was not completely confident about his assessment of p(Win), it 
seems prudent in this case to allocate additional resources to assessment. 
$5000 
0 0.2 0.4 
p(Win) 
0.6 0.8 1.0 
Figure 3: Sensitivity Analysis for p(Win). 
Stochastic sensitivity analysis has proved to be a valuable tool for focusing attention in 
model development [9]. Indeed, we do not suggest that our approach replace this tool. We do 
suggest, however, that our approach be used when examining the sensitivity of a model to 
multiple variables simultaneously. In effect, our approach automates the decision process that 
a person goes through when confronted with a sensitivity analysis. This automation is 
probably overkill for the analysis of a single variable, but it is potentially useful for the 
analysis of multiple variables, a situation in which a traditional sensitivity analysis is difficult 
to display and to comprehend. 
A method for representing confidence that has received renewed attention in the literature 
involves the assignment of bounds or intervals to the probability of events and to the utility 
of outcomes [11, 12, 13]. In this approach, it is assumed that a point value exists for each 
variable, but that the value is known only to lie in a certain range. Given a set of variables 
with assigned intervals, bounds on a target variable can be computed by sweeping each variable 
in the set through its possible range :a�d. for every combination, inferring a point-value for 
the target variable using the laws of .ordinary. probability.6 For example, suppose we are given 
the assignments 
. p(A) = [0.4, 0,6] p(BIA} = [0. 3, 0. 8] 
Using this method for propagatirig bounds, it follows that 
Pmax { AB) Pmax (A) Pmax { B I A)' = { 0 • 6 )( 0 · 8) 
Pmin{AB) = Pmin(A) Pm;0(BIA) = (0.4)(0.3) 
0.48 
0.12 
In other words, the value of p(AB) lies in the interval [0.12, 0. 48]. 
This method of propagating bounds provides another approach for automating sensitivity 
analysis. Indeed, the interpretation underlying .this. method has been referred to as the 
"Bayesian sensitivity analysis interpretation" [14]. One advantage of the bounds approach over 
our focusing method is that it requires only two assessments for each variable; our method 
6The Dempsler-Shafer theory of belief functions also has an interpretation in terms of bounds, but the method of 
propagation is believed to be incommensurate with the method described here [14]. 
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requires the assessment of a probability distribution and a measure of the cost of assessment. 
A disadvantage of the bounds method over our approach, however, is that the reduced 
information content makes it difficult to use the results of the analysis to determine whether a 
variable or set of variables should be modeled further. In particular, the results of interval 
analysis do not convey a clear picture of the degree to which the model is sensitive to a 
variable or set of variables. An accurate reflection of degree of sensitivity is useful for 
balancing the benefits of further modeling with the associated costs. Also, as we mentioned, 
we can reduce the information requirement of our approach by fitting a parametric 
distribution to a small number of assessments. lt is likely that the advantages of having a full 
distribution will outweigh the disadvantages associated with forcing a fit that might not be 
completely accurate. 
Finally, we mention that Critchfield has developed a method for automating sensitivity 
analysis that uses "second order" probabilities and utilities [10]. One difference between his 
approach and ours is that we have tried to provide a precise interpretation for the 1/J 
distributions that is relevant to allocation of resources during knowledge acquisition. 
Critchfield simply proposes that distributions be assessed by requesting a person's "probability 
of his probability." Another difference is that Critchfield uses heuristic methods to evaluate 
the sensitivity of variables; these methods are limited to decisions having only two possible 
alternatives. Our approach, based on decision theory, is not similarly limited. 
Future work 
In this section, we discuss questions raised by our approach and suggest areas for future 
research. 
Our approach has assumed that the rough measures of confidence and cost supplieq by a 
. decision maker will produce' meaningful ·�ecommendations for focusing attention .  There are 
two questions surrounding this assumption.' First, to what degree are these measures precise or 
repeatable? Second, to what degree are these measures accurate? That is, do the measures of 
confidence and cost truly reflect the beliefs and preferences of the decision maker? · Both of 
these questions can be answered empirically. The precision of these assessments can be 
evaluated by giving a decision maker identical assessment tasks, separated by distractions, and 
by comparing the results. The accuracy of these assessments can be measured by determining 
· whether recommendations made by our app'roach agree with the intuition of a decision maker 
in simple decision models. 
There are costs associated with the assessments required by our focusing technique. Do the 
benefits provided by the approach outweigh these costs? Most probably, they do in some cases 
and do not in others. For example, we mentioned that our approach is unlikely to have a net 
benefit for simple decision models whereas it may have a net benefit for complex models. Are 
there other aspects of decision models that make them more or less suitable for our approach? 
Can a decision maker recognize, in a straightforward manner, situations in which the focusing 
method is appropriate? Empirical studies are needed to answer these questions. 
The cost and benefits of the focusing technique itself can be modulated. For example, we 
have assumed Independence amcirig the ¢> distributions and among the cost measures used by the 
approach. This assumption can be relaxed by explicitly representing dependencies among the 
assessmet1ts, providing addit�onal .benefit at additional cost. As another example, whenever our 
· technique fails 'to identify a sensitive closter of variables, a person has the option to consider 
other assessment scenarios for the same cluster, consider other clusters, or terminate the 
analysis. Various costs and benefits are associated with each of these choices. Can such costs 
and benefits be balanced intuitively? If so, our approach is potentially useful. If not, our 
approach is merely a first step in a useless infinite regress. Again, empirical studies are needed 
to answer this important question. 
Finally, we have suggested that the task of identifying clusters of variables for analysis by 
our approach be delegated to the decision maker. However, sensitive combinations might easily 
130 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
be missed. Are there useful heuristic methods for automating this search? Perhaps an 
algorithm guided by the qualitative structure of the network would be effective. In any case, 
artificial intelligence techniques are likely to be useful here. 
Summary 
We examined the Bayesian paradigm for accommodating beliefs and preferences that are held 
with partial confidence. An important notion highlighted by the method is that additional 
modeling can be valuable when assessments are not held with complete confidence. We next 
developed a method that uses decision theory to balance the benefits of additional modeling 
with the associated costs. We saw that the approach can help to focus the attention of a 
knowledge engineer or expert on parts of a decision model that deserve additional refinement. 
It is hoped that our approach wi II facilitate the construction of more robust decision models, 
and help make the construction of such models more efficient. 
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